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A recent World Bank review of economic reforms in industrializing economies during the 1990s 
candidly concludes that, with some exceptions, these economies failed to promote economic growth 
(World Bank 2005). In turn, UNCTAD 2008 (p. 57) suggests that the reason lies in that “more 
knowledge about the factors contributing to economic growth is required”, economic reforms of the 
Washington Consensus genre being not enough and a ‘proactive’, policy-driven catch up process being 
required, at least regarding the Least Developed Countries.  
 
The above are among a variety of statements of late suggesting that the policy and growth promoting 
approaches enshrined by the Washington Consensus are insufficient or inappropriate, one reason being 
their almost exclusive emphases on “economic reforms” (largely independent of context and structure), 
based on a constrained and static view of what are the relevant institutions and how these, along with 
policies, influence economic growth. Moreover, based on theoretical arguments or simply ‘ideology’, 
though direct incentives to innovation are in principle accepted as necessary, there is a strong 
preference for tax incentives over direct subsidization. Underlying this, there is a seemingly ingrained 
view that ‘subsidies to innovation’ have failed, which is not supported by serious empirical research -- 
there being clear successful cases such as those of Israel between 1969 and 1992 and Chile starting in 
the mid-1990s. As to the impact of tax concessions on innovation, various authors show that their 
effects have been ambiguous at best, with a strong presumption that subsidization would have been 
more effective.  
 
Among other problems with the prevailing view of the record of industrializing economies (e.g. unduly 
strong focus on R&D-based innovation and much less on a broader Schumpeterian notion of 
innovation which arguably would be even more relevant), there is also an enhanced awareness of the 
shortcomings of the prevailing justification for innovation policy, that is, market failure in private 
sector R&D. In fact, such failure may originate in other functions, some of them ‘technological’ such 
as design and engineering; others related to management, marketing, market penetration, etc. Last but 
not least, a major point of divergence between the ‘Old’ and the emerging or ‘New’ view on policy 
underpinnings is the notion of system failures, that is, that innovation is blocked not because of lack of 
incentives to business firms but because the innovation system either does not exist or has big gaps in 
business sector support structures (including both, the ‘classical’ science, technology and education 
infrastructure and others, especially those geared to SMEs).  
 
The need for a new systems-evolutionary framework for innovation policy also pertains to advanced 
countries. The ‘evolutionary policy maker’ is an adaptive policy maker rather than the optimizing 
policy maker found in neoclassical economic theory (various papers by Metcalfe). This stems from a 
view that there is radical uncertainty about the future i.e. not all uncertainty confronting policy makers 
being reducible to risk. This view, which links with Schumpeter’s Indeterminacy of History, is much 
more cogent in its policy implications than bounded rationality. 
 
The presence of radical uncertainty has important implications for the policy process -- along with the 
highly dynamic environment that underpins it (stemming from the constant stream of new technologies 
and from the spur of global competition). First, underlying successful innovation policy, we are 
increasingly likely to find nowadays new, knowledge intensive, policy processes, that is, those 
entailing a prior process of setting strategic priorities and policy objectives. Second, in a world were the 
global and often the domestic contexts undergo radical changes, the likelihood that the existing national 
policy portfolio fits the current and future needs of the relevant country or region (be it advanced or 
developing), is bound to be rather low. It follows that, ascertaining a new set of strategic priorities in 
science, technology, higher education and innovation becomes a major and primordial aspect of the 
policy process. Such critical review of policy fundamentals will have to precede the gradual building 
up of a new policy portfolio, which reflects the new global and domestic situation and trends. 
 
The above views shape the intellectual underpinnings of a higher level of innovation policy which we 
term the Strategic Level (Avnimelch and Teubal 2008, Sercovich and Teubal 2008), to be sharply 
differentiated with respect to the existing policy set up of most countries -- focused on what may be 
called the Operation Level of Policy. Its major task consists of identifying new Strategic Priorities and 
contributing to their articulation in terms of new policies. 
 
Ojectives 
The paper will: 
 
i. Submit an overall perspective of an integrated systems-evolutionary 
perspective to innovation and technology policy (broadly defined) and a 
synthesis of the differences between the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ approaches to 
innovation policy. 
 
ii. Put forward a ‘strategic’ level of policy and assess its institutional, 
governance and capabilities underpinnings  
 
iii. Provide illustrations of ‘strategic policy-making’ and its links with the 
operational level of policy (taken from among the experiences of Taiwan 




Objective i will involve extending and adapting  previous work on the Systems-
Evolutionary perspective to Innovation Policy (Avnimelech and Teubal op. cit). The 
differences between "old" and 'new'/ Systems/Evolutionary perspectives refer to: the 
justification of policies; to their Focus and Objectives; to the nature of Incentives and 
Incentives’ Programs; to the overall Approach to policy making; and to the existence or 




1 Notes on the Strategic Level of Policy
This is a central difference between the the Old and New approaches to Innovation Policy broadly 
defined. The need for a strategic level of policy derives from the radical changes in the global 
environment (both actual and expected in the future) including its enhanced complexity, dynamism and 
turbulence; from the enhanced need for policy targeting; and from the enhanced needs for policy 
coordination in order to assure coherence and dynamic efficiency of the new policy portfolio aimed at. 
 
The basic function of the strategic level is to identify and specify strategic priorities, which to a large 
extent, should precede the actual design of new policies. Another important function is to contribute, 
jointly with the operacional level of policy, to the translation or articulation of these priorities in terms 
of new incentives programs and institutional changes (this would require identification of the relevant 
market and system failures blocking the attainment of these priorities in the context of the existing 
innovation and policy system including the set of policies already in operation). In both of these 
functions a broad, systems evolutionary perspective should be undertaken e.g. a greater integration of 
policies towards the STE infrstructure with policies directly supporting  Commercial Innovation in the 
business sector (including, whenever relevant, with venture capital and other high tech directed policies 
concerning the future evolution of a country’s high tech cluster) 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout we will be assuming that an operational level of STE & CI policy already exists in the relevant 
country 
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The strategic level should function continuously by undertaking search, research and discovery 
activities in a systematic way, while attempting to build up the relevant capabilities (note that these 
differ substantially from the capabilities required to implement existing policies that is with operacional 
policy capabilities). It should deal not only in product but also in process that is not only what the new 
priorities and policies should be but also what process or processes should be introduced (including the 
policy processes mentioned above) in order to effectively identify and specify these new conceptual 
entitities i.e Strategic Priorities. 
 
A main underpinning of the strategic level is to develop a future integrated vision of the economy and 
society; and of the profiles of innovation based growth that might lead to the materialization of this 
vision (this would then translate into the set of priorities mentioned above). 
 
A Strategic  Policy Institution 
A Strategic Science, Technology and and Higher Education (STE) & Commercial Innovation 
(CI)Policy Forum should permit a permanent activity at the strategic level of policy. It is critical to 
attain an adequate ‘positioning’ of this institution in the overall STE & CI governance structure of the 
country. Thus is some cases attempts are made to reduce the traditional dependence of the above type 
of policy institution with the country’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) in order to better reflect the 
enhanced knowledge creation and supraministerial coordination function rather than specific lower 
level (and even specific Agency related) budgeting decisions. In some countries like in Korea attempts 
have been made to link such a type of policy institution to the PM or President rather than to a specific 
Ministry like the Ministry of Sciene and Technology. In LDC it is imperative to link strongly this type 
of policy institution with the agency in charge of defining the overall economic & social development 
strategy of the country. Again and depending on case, this may also involve a somewhat reduce 
dependence to specific ministries and to the Ministry of Finance; and enhanced direct dependence on 
the Government (or PM or President) itself. 
 
Another point is the link between the strategic policy forum and the operational, policy execution 
agencies. Links there should be since operational experience and developments in the field should be 
central to the identification of new strategic priorities and their translation into new programs/policies. 
But the strategic policy forum should be independent of the operational agencies in charge of 
promoting CI in its capacity to propose new priorities and programs as well as in the evaluation of past 
policies (frequently being done by the operational units themselves).  
 
The central functions of the new strategic forum or agency are 
(1) Identify and Specify Strategic Priorities in the STE and CI areas; and the Market and 
System Failures which, given existing policies and the existing national innovation 
system, block their attainment within the relevant time period 
(2) Jointly with operational STE & CI policy agencies, contribute to the translation of 
the above priorities into new  programs, institutional changes and other policy 
actions 
(3) Characterize the existing overall policy portfolio of the country and the ‘desirable’ 
portfolio aimed at within the next 5-10 years 
(4) In some cases, play a central, professional role in the determination of a national, 
integrated STE & CI  policy budget for the country 
(5) Play an important ‘coordinating’ role among the various Ministries and Agencies 
involved in STE  & CI policy  
 
Function (1) is the main function and it is linked very closely to the capacity of strategic forum to 
frame policies. Explicit priority setting and undertaking this within an integrated STE & CI framework 
is relatively new both in advanced and certainly in Developing Countries: most priorities in the past 
were implicit rather than explicit and if explicit, not sufficiently specified. Therefore, during its first 
years the strategic policy forum should undergoe a strong process of learning and building up of 
capabilities and networks. Depending on the overall capabilities of the specific country considered, the 
strategic policy forum should be involved in identifying required resources & capabilities, selective 
employment of high calliber professionals, learning by doing, benchmarking relevant mechanisms and 
methodologies used in priority setting, etc. For this and for other functions, it is important that the new 
agency develop close working relationships with the operational policy agencies and with the other 
relevant actors in the STE & CI policy scene e.g depending on country Ministry of Science and 
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Technology, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Industry Associations, MOF etc. 
This should also include new knowledge/skill intensive mechanisms of interaction and collaboration 
e.g. joint brainstorming sessions, joint research teams, etc.2 
 
Undertaking a continued and systematic process of identifying STE & CI strategic priorities is of 
enormous importance. The process inherently involves incomplete information and muddling through; 
and in some cases, generating additional information necessitates implementation of some policies, 
possibly on an experimental basis (“doing”)3. The actual methodologies for identification of an explicit 
set of Strategic Priorities will require significant additional work         of a small number of 
appropriately selected and integrated teams4. Each team would start with the accumulated knowledge 
embedded within its members and from the lines of action and knowledge reported below. Additional 
information and knowledge resulting from brainstorming, interviews, search-research-discovery, 
analysis and benchmarking will lead to further specification both of the priorities and of the policies 
and other related action items reported here. These ‘intermediate’ results would then be the subject of a 
subsequent round of analysis and brainstorming, and so on. Needless to say that beyond specific 
knowledge about the particular country, successful setting of such priorities requires a critical mass of 
knowledge about priorities and policies implemented in different contexts and countries; about how to 
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